Fictional

I don’t think it’s fictional in the least.

Iwhat you are saying. I am sayin may be a mistake.

You keep telling me this.

Correct me if I am wrong again – the objects of the mind are the things of reality.

I know discourses do not inform you much but that is precisely why we should look at Hiroo Onoda, a Japanese soldier who held out for 29 years after the end of the war refusing to believe the war had ended. Only when a senior officer he recognised came to relieve him of his duties did he surrender.

Now you have said, memories become fantasies, fictions. That they are indistinguishable.

I fail to see this as a proper argument. It was Heidegger also who fell into the same rabbit hole and it had dire consequences resulting in the (physical) death of people, and the trust of others. To not be able to discern fiction from memory of real place and time is to not understand the what is motivated by the senses and what is motivated by the perceptual apparatus.

Onoda’s refusal to see what is happening in the real world (that people are not fighting Philippines and that only an order from his command can relief him of duty is to not see that perhaps the command could not reach him to tell him directly, and for him to adapt to the new situation. This, to me, is dangerous. Indeed, it had led to a few more unnecessary deaths, and a whole lot more effort on the Japanese and Philippine governments, and resources to bring him to surrender and home to Japan.

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(I can imagine that you will scoff at this and say, “that is not evidence”. But then I will think, also, that maybe perhaps you are not unlike Hiroo Onoda, is still hiding somewhere (withdrawn) in the recesses of your own mind.)

4 thoughts on “Fictional

  1. I feel like you will see this as irreconcilable Because of lack of trying, or because of epistemological incompatibility. Or semantic impreciseness. Or laziness. Or some failure of agency. No.

    The only failure is in the non-acceptance of the truth, the failure of agency itself, which is:

    It is because of an ontological truth of the situation.

    Someone who has never seen snow, refusing to accept that the discussion of snow is not the same as knowledge of actual snow.

    That is where the problem lay: in a human equivocation and assertion of a category which does not actually exist between, Over or under objects. A obstinate refusal to allow a thing to Be what it is, as it is. Blatant and obstinate refusal under the guise of innocence.

    As opposed to ontological equity where every Being is valid. ✊🏾

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  2. This reply comment post of yours shows me that you are completely misinterpreting what is saying. Completely. The meaning that you’re gaining from what I’m saying is not what I’m saying. You could tell me that then I’m not using discourse in a good way or whatever. But I’m telling you it doesn’t matter what way I formulate my sentences. It doesn’t matter how I try to develop the argument. It doesn’t matter whether I let you go first and let you introduce the field, it doesn’t matter. You will always be misinterpreting what I’m saying. And the reason for this is because there is no such thing as a common discourse. It appears to you like there is. But I’m telling you: i’ve tried. Over and over. With you, with others who think like you. You are simply not able to understand what I’m talking about. It is obvious. There is no amount of Definition or argument that can dig underneath the assumptions that go into what you understand as a reason, discourse, thoughts, being, etc. There just isn’t. And you don’t except it. And you can’t see it.

    Hence: two irreconcilable routes.

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  3. By the way. So I did order two copies of this copy of collapse. Speculative realist issue. If you would like me to send you it. You have my email. Send me your address and I’ll send you it when I get it.

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