I had been on that forum for probably two years, and someone then started talking about how I might like this Non-philosophy stuff over yonder. Then I started checking out Laruelle’s essays, and then his books, and it re really resonated with me.
Somewhere in The Philosophical Hack, when it was still Constructive Undoing, I conveyed an anecdote of how I came upon Kiekegaard’s Either/Or…
… it was the same with Laruelle, and then by a strange extension somewhat similar with Harman’s On Vicarious Causation…
…The post explained how I came to be interested in philosophy at all, but as well, the beginnings of what we are dealing with in philosophy itself at all times..for the significance of this moment is that I had never read (or if I had, then I didn’t understand it nor tried to understand it) a single word of philosophy until Kierkegaard, and yet…
…In short, the pieces made perfect sense to me without even having to sit and ponder what they were saying. In fact, the feeling was if I had wrote the pieces myself, yet as though in some other time or moment that I had forgotten until that moment of the reading. I intuitively knew exactly what they all were talking about.
The incredible and truly unbelievable part of this was that I was so astounded, that upon starting to read (here: Kierkegaard) and having the feeling that I had written it, I made a little game for myself just to see if I was fooling myself somehow. I would skip a chunk of pages and then guess what he might be saying where I landed. For indeed the feeling moved me such that I could trace the trajectories of discussions through lengths of prose enough to skip chunks of pages (or paragraphs, as the case may be) and without looking prior, and guess where he were at in the argument. I could literally formulate the discursive route he took (as I would later on go back and read the pages I had skipped ) in the pages I had not yet read, assess how much had been written in the pages I had skipped, and think to myself concretely where the book was at in the discussion, actually think about the exact argument he would be making in that point in the book, only to have it be confirmed then upon reading. I would even skip forward and backward. This (but by extension, these) event to me was so absolutely unbelievable, that I doubted my sanity due to it. Contrary to some who might find it fascinating and pleasant, by contrast, I was entirely distressed and worried by it. I was compelled forward by the desire in the attempt to prove my experience and understanding of the texts incorrect.
It happened with many philosophers, but With Kierkegard it was most profound and extended through every singe one of his books without any problem or skip. Literally, after the first few sentences or paragraphs for orientation, but sometimes only the first sentence of the page, and without reading even any forwards, introductions or commentaries by other authors (like Hannay, or Hong and Hong), I could tell exactly what was being discussed, why it was significant and what part it played in the larger extended argument of the book, but then also ( I would find) the entire project of the author. But not only this, I also knew why he had chosen all the particular literary stories, characters, myths and analogies that he does.
It took me a probably 5 years of encountering these kinds of events with many authors — from Hegel, to Heidegger, from Wittgenstein, to Sartre to Delueze and Guattari — before I could believe that I was not reading into the pieces something that was not there, making things up. I doubted that I could know and understand as well as I did, even when the evidence arrived in front of me time and time again, and I felt that I was going, or had gone, quite insane. Nevertheless, after may years, I could no longer deny the truth of the situation, and I just resolved to believe that the extended event was not false or some figment of a compromised psyche.
Indeed Kierkegaard, but these other authors as well, I knew before I had even looked to their pages. By the eventual acceptance of this truth, thus I would over time come to formulate and iterate that philosphers were saying the exact same thing, indeed, talking about the same thing but using different terms and clausal structures.
Frustratingly, by conversing with other learned and knowledgable philosophers I was to find this view upon philosophy is quite controversial if not outright offensive to most.
However, oddly enough and very strange, the truth is that reading these philosophers merely confirmed what I already knew — even as I did not wish or want to know it, that is, even as I doubted that I could know such things.
Hence, the route by which philosophy come unto me is different than the way philosophy is come upon by most philosophers. And this difference, coincidentally, is what is confirmed everywhere I read philosophy, both in content, context, syntax and semantics.
It is what Kierkegaard calls absurd and ironic. It is what Delueze and Guattari infer in their discussion about capitalism and modernity. What Derrida labels difference. What Lyotard describes as the differend. And as well, What Zizek confirms by his Parallax view. Everywhere I read philosophy, what Heidegger calls the same arises to Being.
I could go on.
I don’t know what the post of mine was, but then, through kind of checking that Non-philosophy stuff out, Harman and his object ontology came up. I started checking OOO out, and those who were part of the Speculative Realist Conference in 2007, and they mentioned Laruelle also. The philosopher Levi Bryant also could be called an object ontologist. He has a book called The Democracy of Objects, and other books on his version of object ontology.
All those SR guys seemed to have stumbled on the same problem, the same difference in view, that I stumbled upon, and they seemed now to be calling it realism. This name for what they were coming upon allowed me to refine what I was talking about, as to what religion might be, to be able to distinguish what was real from what is true. I just think that Harman has the most significant version of this truth toward Realism, for it resembles what I’m concerned with in my work. But I think Harmon is more of a strict philosopher and so he says a lot of things way better than I am able to. In essence, he’s kind of a voice for ideas I already kind of had, but he kind of feels them out a little bit better, develops the thoughts a little bit better, and speaks about them better, and of course, can argue about them better against other philosophers.
Anyways, and so it is, my work is more about “orientation upon objects“, than it is about an ontology of objects; I actually play around with the notion that I am concerned more with teleology.