The idea of form is that the formal cause Of a thing, in short, is the shape that it’s in. The cause of a thing is it's form. Graham Harman proposes to be able to develop an ontology based on form. Most philosophy that we encounter in the continental tradition, otherwise known as the phenomenological … Continue reading And

Knowing and knowledge

The process of knowing is specific to time and place, that is, knowing is a temporal and spatial process of a thing. But knowledge as objects of the mind are atemporal and aspatial. Often, we confuse knowledge for knowing, but rarely do we make the reverse mistake.

Reply (more questions on): orientation upon objects and ontology of objects

Nice background to your thinking. Speaking of backgrounds, I would like to add your bio. Anyways, and so it is, my work is more about “orientation upon objects“, than it is about an ontology of objects; I actually play around with the notion that I am concerned more with teleology.  Orientation upon objects and significance of significance I … Continue reading Reply (more questions on): orientation upon objects and ontology of objects

Orientation upon Objects and Significance of Significance

Like I say here and there...Object Oriented Ontology resonates with me; it resonates with what I am doing, with my work.  At risk of sounding retroactive, though, I already had this kind of...understanding, if you will, of object-Being; it began with Francios Laruelle's Non-philosophy which I just stumbled on in the Philosophy Now forum that I … Continue reading Orientation upon Objects and Significance of Significance

“On Vicarious Causation”.

Graham Harman’s seminal piece on the displacing of human centrality to causality Presently I am revisiting the nature of cause. Revisiting the fall into efficient cause and the repercussions of the relationship between truth and reality.

Atemporality and aspatiality

Objects of the mind are characterised by atemporality and aspatiality (my term) while objects of reality (things) are characterised by temporality and spatiality. Representations of things (mind-objects) are inconsistent with reality (thing-objects) because of this difference in characterisation. Phenomena and noumena are distinct. Problems arise when we engage with reality with non-existent (without ontology) atemporal … Continue reading Atemporality and aspatiality