The idea of form is that the formal cause Of a thing, in short, is the shape that it’s in. The cause of a thing is it's form. Graham Harman proposes to be able to develop an ontology based on form. Most philosophy that we encounter in the continental tradition, otherwise known as the phenomenological … Continue reading And
One of the first questions a person needs to ask when addressing or confronting philosophy, is what are they involved with. The question of "the philosophical", for a term, is actually secondary. Because the first question Hass to be is "why am I doing this?" What am I doing when I am viewing or otherwise … Continue reading Purpose and Philosophy
I am completely happy and grateful for these questions. They are at the heart of the matter. The issue revolving before us is whether there are objects, and then also objects of the mind. I forget what you termed the first one. My issue has directly to do with how you are able to know … Continue reading Reply: mind-object/thing-object distinction
One of the main components of psychology and psychological theory that I truly enjoy and adhere to comes from the beginning of psychology. Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis. It is interesting that so many psychologists and counselors and people that deal with mental health and mental issues in general do not even know a simple discernment … Continue reading Form and efficiency
The issue revolving before us is whether there are objects, and then also objects of the mind. I forget what you termed the first one. My issue has directly to do with how you are able to know that there is an object only of the mind, and then an object that is not of … Continue reading Objects of the mind and other myths
I am beginning to understanding what you are saying. But this does not mean I agree. It is possible to locate or identify a particular way of knowing which can be generalized to certain characteristics. It is possible to do this in the context of￼ causality. The question that is primary to knowledge is not … Continue reading Reply: cause and object (or object as cause)
It is possible to locate or identify a particular way of knowing which can be generalized to certain characteristics. It is possible to do this in the context of￼ causality. The question that is primary to knowledge is not what is doing the knowledge; It is not necessary for a cause of knowing, or an … Continue reading Cause and Object
Harman argues for a flat ontology, in which all objects (of the mind) are on equal footing. Here is his list of examples of things (of the mind) which are real — Sherlock Holmes, real humans and animals, chemicals, hallucinations. Delanda pointed out in that a realist does not necessarily mean one is a default … Continue reading Flat material ontology
The process of knowing is specific to time and place, that is, knowing is a temporal and spatial process of a thing. But knowledge as objects of the mind are atemporal and aspatial. Often, we confuse knowledge for knowing, but rarely do we make the reverse mistake.
Nice background to your thinking. Speaking of backgrounds, I would like to add your bio. Anyways, and so it is, my work is more about “orientation upon objects“, than it is about an ontology of objects; I actually play around with the notion that I am concerned more with teleology. Orientation upon objects and significance of significance I … Continue reading Reply (more questions on): orientation upon objects and ontology of objects
Like I say here and there...Object Oriented Ontology resonates with me; it resonates with what I am doing, with my work. At risk of sounding retroactive, though, I already had this kind of...understanding, if you will, of object-Being; it began with Francios Laruelle's Non-philosophy which I just stumbled on in the Philosophy Now forum that I … Continue reading Orientation upon Objects and Significance of Significance
Graham Harman’s seminal piece on the displacing of human centrality to causality Presently I am revisiting the nature of cause. Revisiting the fall into efficient cause and the repercussions of the relationship between truth and reality.
Objects of the mind are characterised by atemporality and aspatiality (my term) while objects of reality (things) are characterised by temporality and spatiality. Representations of things (mind-objects) are inconsistent with reality (thing-objects) because of this difference in characterisation. Phenomena and noumena are distinct. Problems arise when we engage with reality with non-existent (without ontology) atemporal … Continue reading Atemporality and aspatiality
There are two things I do as this kind of being - I think and I interact with the world in the world. Without thought, and without the world and being inside of it I will not be interacting with it. I would be “doing something else”. But clearly this “something else” (if it exists … Continue reading objects, words, mind, things
“I’m wondering how words contain any meaning at all, but then also how definition is then anyway attached to meaning. Why should the definition have a meaning? Does meaning have definition?” Saussurean linguisticsSaussure is undoubtedly one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century. Almost single-handed he created the modern field of linguistics. Saussure … Continue reading Language and cognition